

EXTRACTS FROM MR. DULLES'S BRIEFING NOTES FOR BRIEFING  
OF MR. TRUMAN, 12 AUGUST 1958

... Then considerable USSR delay -- unusual at this stage of correspondence where Soviet had been very prompt.

4. Reason: Khrushchev trip to Peiping, leaving August 1 returning August 4. (We, [REDACTED] reported probable Peiping trip. Matter kept entirely secret Moscow and Peiping until issuance of Khrushchev-Mao communique on August 3.). We believe Mao put pressure on Khrushchev for visit Peiping, considered himself neglected in this entire exchange and probably annoyed at Khrushchev's inclusion Nehru.

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Upon return Moscow Khrushchev shifted tactics and insisted matter be referred General Assembly. There was already pending from earlier Security Council debates two resolutions, first, USA resolution and subsequently USSR resolution for reference to General Assembly. US-UK quickly accepted General Assembly formula. France acquiesced without enthusiasm.

Khrushchev, however, also insisting that there be early summit conference to deal with world problems.

5. Meanwhile Chicoms in order to bring themselves into the picture made threatening moves, particularly in the Taiwan Straits area and have brought down to airfields opposite Formosa considerable number of modern fighter planes--MIG-17's. We do not believe any early all out attack on Quemoy Matsu contemplated as

no sign of land or naval buildup in area. However, consider possible Chicoms may try to starve out off-shore islands by seizing air control of Taiwan Straits and threatening the provisioning of roughly 100,000 Chinat troops on Quemoy and Matsu.

First reaction Chiang Kai-Shek and Chinat leaders was somewhat panicky. Strong messages to USA from them both for the buildup of Chinat military forces, particularly air, and desire for more clear-cut assurances regarding US position respecting off-shore islands.